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Two schemes for quantum secure conditional direct communication are proposed, where
a set of EPR pairs of maximally entangled particles in Bell states, initially made by the
supervisor Charlie, but shared by the sender Alice and the receiver Bob, functions as
quantum information channels for faithful transmission. After insuring the security of
the quantum channel and obtaining the permission of Charlie (i.e. Charlie is trustworthy
and cooperative, which means the ’conditional’ in the two schemes), Alice and Bob begin
their private communication under the control of Charlie. In the first scheme, Alice
transmits secret message to Bob in a deterministic manner with the help of Charlie by
means of Alice’s local unitary transformations, both Alice and Bob’s local measurements,
and both of Alice and Charlie’s public classical communication. In the second scheme,
the secure communication between Alice and Bob can be achieved via public classical
communication of Charlie and Alice, and the local measurements of both Alice and
Bob. The common feature of these protocols is that the communications between two
communication parties Alice and Bob depend on the agreement of the third side Charlie.
Moreover, transmitting one bit secret message, the sender Alice only needs to apply a
local operation on her one qubit and send one bit classical information. We also show
that the two schemes are completely secure if quantum channels are perfect.
Keywords: Quantum secure conditional direct communication; EPR pairs; local mea-
surement; local unitary transformation
1. Introduction
In the information society, more and more people wish to transmit secret messages.
The way to achieve communication in secret is to use a cryptographic protocol, that
is, before transmitting their secret messages the two distant communication parties
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must distribute secret key first. Although in many ways, the secret key distribution
problem is just as difficult as the original problem of communication in private
through a classical channel, fortunately, quantum mechanics can be used to do key
distribution in such a way that Alice and Bob’s security can not be compromised.
This procedure is known as quantum key distribution or quantum cryptography.
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard presented the first quantum cryptography, BB84
protocol,1 using quantum mechanics to distribute keys between Alice and Bob,
without any possibility of a compromise. Since then Ekert proposed a quantum
key distribution scheme depending on the correlation of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) pair, the maximally entangled state of two particles in 1991,2 Bennett put
forward a quantum cryptography scheme known as B92 protocol,3 and numerous
quantum cryptographic protocols on both theoretical and experimental aspects[4−19]
have been proposed.
Shimizu and Imoto20,21 and Beige et al.22 presented novel quantum secure di-
rect communication schemes, in which the two parties communicate important mes-
sages directly without first establishing a shared secret key to encrypt them and
the message is deterministically sent through the quantum channel, but can be read
only after a final transmission of an additional classical information for each qubit.
Thereafter, many quantum secure direct communication schemes, such as Bostro¨m
and Felbinger’s23 ”ping pong protocol” which is insecure if it is operated in a noisy
quantum channel, as indicated by Wo´jcik,24 and Deng et al.’s two schemes, one us-
ing EPR pair block25 and the other with a quantum one-time-pad,26 were proposed.
Unfortunately, in all these secure direct communication protocols it is necessary to
send the qubits carrying secret messages in the public channel. Therefore a potential
eavesdropper, Eve, can intercept the qubits in transmission and make the communi-
cation interrupted. In order to prevent the qubits transmitted in the public channel,
Yan et al. put forward three protocols for quantum secure direct communication,
using EPR pairs and teleportation,27 by EPR pairs and entanglement swapping,28
and based on GHZ states and entanglement swapping,29 respectively. We suggested
two schemes for controlled and secure direct communication using three-particle en-
tangled state and teleportation.30,31 Cai gave an one-time-pad key communication
protocol with entanglement.32 Since there is not a transmission of the qubits with
the secret messages between two communication parties in the public channel, they
are secure for secret direct communication if perfect quantum channel is used. How-
ever, in the protocols of Refs. [27, 30, 31], for transmitting one bit secret message,
Alice has to make Bell measurement on two qubit and send two bits classical infor-
mation to Bob because of four random outcomes produced by Bell measurement,
so it would waste the classical information resource. In this paper, we would like to
simplify these protocols and give two even simpler but more economical and more
efficient schemes with EPR pairs. In these schemes, for her to transmit one bit
secret message, Alice only needs to perform a local operation on one qubit and send
one bit classical information to Bob. Therefore, our proposed schemes are easy to
realize in experiment and greatly economize classical information resource.
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2. Quantum Secure Conditional Direct Communication via EPR Pairs
Consider the following scenario. Suppose that the administrative personnel of the
server, Charlie, wishes to control the correspondence between users. This means
that if and only if Charlie gives his permission (that is, Charlie is trustworthy and
cooperative), Alice and Bob can correspond with each other. However, the users
wish to communicate in secret and not altered during transmission. What can
they do? Our following two schemes will suit this task. In our schemes, there are
three parties: the controller Charlie and the users Alice and Bob. The present two
communication protocols, called quantum secure conditional direct communication
protocols, are designed to work only provided Charlie wants them to do so. Here
the word ’conditional’ means that Charlie is trustworthy and cooperative. How do
these new schemes work?
First, the controller Charlie prepares EPR pairs in Bell states:
Φ+ ≡ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
=
1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉)
=
1√
2
(|+ y〉| − y〉+ | − y〉|+ y〉), (1)
Φ− ≡ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)
=
1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉)
=
1√
2
(|+ y〉|+ y〉+ | − y〉| − y〉), (2)
Ψ+ ≡ 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)
=
1√
2
(|++〉 − | − −〉)
=
i√
2
(| − y〉| − y〉 − |+ y〉|+ y〉), (3)
Ψ− ≡ 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)
=
1√
2
(| −+〉 − |+−〉)
=
i√
2
(|+ y〉| − y〉 − | − y〉|+ y〉), (4)
and then sends one qubit of each pair to Alice and Bob. Here |+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√
2
,
|−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√
2
, | + y〉 = |0〉+i|1〉√
2
, and | − y〉 = |0〉−i|1〉√
2
. These EPR pairs, shared by
the sender Alice and the receiver Bob, function as quantum information channel.
In order to keep perfect quantum channel, Alice, Bob and Charlie then choose ran-
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domly a subset of EPR pairs, and do some appropriate tests of fidelity. They can
use the schemes testing the security of EPR pairs (quantum channel) in Refs.[2, 4,
13, 25, 27]. Passing the test insures that they continue to hold sufficiently pure,
maximally entangled quantum states (i.e. the quantum channel is perfect). How-
ever, if tampering has occurred, they discard these EPR pairs and construct new
EPR pairs again.
After insuring the security of quantum channel and getting the approval of
Charlie (this means that Charlie is trustworthy and cooperative), Alice and Bob
start their quantum secure conditional direct communication under the control of
Charlie.
2.1. Based on Local Unitary Transformations
A.1 Alice, Bob and Charlie arrange all EPR pairs in random order. The three of
them agree on that the four Bell states are encoded information of two classical bits
Φ+ → 00,Φ− → 01,Ψ+ → 10,Ψ− → 11. (5)
A.2 Alice and Bob agree on that Alice encodes information by local operations
σ0 = I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, σ1 = σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1| (6)
on EPR pairs, and assign secretely one bit to Alice’s operations as following encoding
σ0 → 0, σ1 → 1. (7)
A.3 Alice encodes her secret messages (secret classical bits) on the EPR pairs
sequence. Explicitly, Alice applies a predetermined unitary operation on each of
her particles according to her secret message sequence.
Suppose that Alice and Bob initially share EPR pair Φ+, and Alice wants to
transmit 1 to Bob, then Alice performs a local operation σ1 on her particle, thus
the state Φ+ is turned into Φ−.
A.4 Alice performs a local measurement on her qubit, in the basis {|+〉, |−〉},
and classically (and publicly) broadcasts the measurement outcome (on which basis
state of {|+〉, |−〉} he obtained by projection) to the receiver Bob.
A.5 Bob makes a local measurement on his particle also in the basis {|+〉, |−〉}.
After that he informs Charlie that he has made a measurement on his qubit over a
classical channel, but does not tell the result of his measurement.
From Eq.(2), Bob’s possible post-measurement states of his particle are |−〉 and
|+〉 depending on Alice’s possible measurement outcomes |+〉 and |−〉, respectively.
A.6 Charlie tells Bob which EPR pair Alice and Bob initially share. To do this,
he needs to inform Bob two classical bits through classical channel.
A.7 Bob can read out Alice’s secret message by Charlie’s classical information
and the two measurement results of both Alice and himself.
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From Charlie’s two bits classical information 00, Bob knows that Alice and he
initially share EPR pair Φ+. By Eq.(1) and both Alice and Bob’s outcomes of
measurement, Bob can deduce Alice’s secret message 1.
In this scheme, EPR pairs functioning as quantum channel must be at least in
two Bell states. If only EPR pairs in one Bell state function as quantum channel,
then Charlie have no control over the two communication parties Alice and Bob,
since Bob can infer Alice’s secret message only by Alice and Bob’s measurement
outcomes.
2.2. Based on Local Measurements
B.1 Alice, Bob and Charlie randomly sequence all EPR pairs and agree beforehand
as the encoding Eq.(5).
B.2 Alice and Bob also agree on that if Alice’s measurement outcome is the same
with the secret message to be transmitted, then Alice sends classical information 0
to Bob, otherwise she sends classical information 1 to Bob.
B.3 Alice makes a local measurement on each of her particles, in the compu-
tational basis {|0〉, |1〉}, and publicly sends Bob the corresponding classical infor-
mation according to the secret message to be transmitted to Bob over classical
channel. Explicitly, if Alice’s measurement outcome is |0〉 and the secret message is
0, or outcome |1〉 and secret message 1, then Alice sends classical information 0 to
Bob; otherwise, that is, Alice’s result of measurement is |0〉 but her secret message
is 1, or result |1〉 but secret message 0, she transfers classical information 1 to Bob.
B.4 Bob performs a measurement on his qubit along z-axis and makes known
to Charlie, but does not announce his measurement outcome.
B.5 Charlie informs Bob which EPR pair Alice and Bob initially share.
B.6 By his outcomes of measurement and Charlie’s classical information, Bob
can deduce Alice’s measurement results. According to the classical information he
received from Alice, Bob can infer the secret message that Alice wants to transmit
to him.
For instance, if Charlie’s classical information is 0001101100011110, then the
EPR pairs are Φ+, Φ−, Ψ+, Ψ−, Φ+, Φ−, Ψ− and Ψ+, respectively. If Bob’s mea-
surement outcomes on the eight EPR pairs are the states |0〉, |0〉, |1〉, |0〉, |1〉, |0〉, |0〉, |1〉,
then he can infer that Alice’s outcomes of measurement are |0〉, |0〉, |0〉, |1〉, |1〉, |0〉, |1〉, |0〉.
Based on Alice’s classical information 10001111, Bob can deduce the secret message
10010101 that Alice wishes to send to him.
In this scheme, EPR pairs functioning as quantum channel must be at least in
more than two Bell states. The reason is as follows: without loss of generality, we
suppose that only EPR pairs in the Bell states Φ− and Ψ+ function as quantum
channel. From Eqs.(2)-(3), Alice and Bob can get out of control by means of
measuring their respective particles in the same basis {|+ y〉, | − y〉}.
The common feature of the two schemes is that communication between two
sides depends on the agreement of the third side Charlie (i.e. Charlie is trustworthy
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and cooperative). If the controller Charlie does not transmit classical information
to Bob, that is, he does not tell Bob the real order of all EPR pairs (i.e. he is
not faithful), then Bob can neither infer Alice’s local unitary operators in the first
scheme nor her measurement outcomes in the second scheme, therefore Bob can not
obtain her secret messages. That is why we suppose that Charlie is trustworthy and
cooperative and call the two proposed protocols quantum secure conditional direct
communication protocols. The two schemes have the advantage of the schemes in
Refs.[27, 30, 31]. For transmitting one bit secret message, in Refs.[27, 30, 31], Alice
has to make Bell measurement on two qubits and send two bits classical information
to Bob because of four random outcomes produced by Bell measurement, so it would
waste the classical information resource. However, in the above two schemes, Alice
only needs to perform two local operations (a local unitary operation and a local
measurement) for the first scheme, or one local operation (a local measurement)
for the second scheme on one qubit and send one bit classical information to Bob.
Therefore, our proposed schemes are easy to realize in experiment and greatly save
classical information resource.
At the same time these two quantum communication schemes can achieve faith-
fully transmission of delicate information across a noisy environment assuming that
classical information is robust and easy to protect against noise (as it is). Also the
entanglement of EPR pair is independent of the spatial location of Bob relative
to Alice so that Alice and Charlie can transfer information without even knowing
Bob’s location - they needs only to broadcast their encoding information via classi-
cal channel, for example Alice and Charlie can write their encoding information on
a newspaper. Because the local measurement outcomes are random, so in these two
protocols, the secret messages are transmitted without revealing any information
to a potential eavesdropper if the quantum channel is perfect EPR pairs.
3. Security in the Proposed Protocols
It is evident that the security of these protocols are only determined by the quantum
channel. If the quantum channel is perfect EPR pairs, the protocols must be safety
ones. By using the schemes testing the security of EPR pairs, we can obtain a perfect
quantum channel. For example, Alice, Bob and Charlie choose randomly a subset
of EPR pairs, then Alice and Bob perform local measurements on their respective
qubits along z-axis or x-axis at random. After measurements, Charlie broadcasts
the order of EPR pairs in the chosen subset. Depending on Charlie’s classical
information and comparing Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes, they can test
the security of EPR pairs and obtain a perfect quantum channel as in Ref.[27].
Local measurement outcomes ensure the security of the two proposed schemes.
Based on outcomes, Alice, Bob and Charlie verify whether there is an attack by Eve
and obtain a perfect quantum channel. Therefore these two schemes for quantum
direct communication using EPR pairs and local operations are absolutely reliable,
deterministic and secure.
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How is it guaranteed that the two quantum secure conditional direct commu-
nications are secure against attacks by an eavesdropper? An eavesdropper, Eve,
may have several kinds of strategies to attack. We shall consider that Eve enforces
the intercept-resend strategy and tries to extract some information. We show that
authorized persons can detect these attacks as they examine the quantum channel.
As mentioned in Ref. [27], Eve can obtain information if the quantum channel
is not the perfect EPR pairs.
For example if Eve couples EPR pair with her probe in preparing or distributing
EPR pair, and makes the quantum channel in GHZ states
|P±〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|000〉 ± |111〉), |Q±〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|001〉 ± |110〉),
|R±〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|010〉 ± |101〉), |S±〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|011〉 ± |100〉), (8)
then she is in the same position with the legitimate party Alice or Bob. But this case
can be ruled out as long as Alice and Bob check the EPR pairs by means of their
local measurement in the basis {|0〉, |1〉} or basis {|+〉, |−〉} randomly and comparing
their measurement results as stated in Ref.[27]. If Eve uses so called entanglement
pair method to obtain information, she will also be found by Alice and Bob’s test,
which was shown in Ref.[27]. So in any case, as long as an eavesdropper exists, we
can find her and insure the security of quantum channel to realize secure quantum
communication.
In summary we provide two schemes for quantum secure conditional direct com-
munication via EPR pairs, one based on local unitary operations and local measure-
ments, the other by local measurements. In the two protocols, a set of EPR pairs
of maximally entangled particles in Bell states, initially made by the supervisor
Charlie, but shared by the sender Alice and the receiver Bob, functions as quantum
information channels for faithful transmission. After insuring the security of the
quantum channels, if Charlie would like to help Alice and Bob to communicate,
that is, Charlie is trustworthy and cooperative, which is the condition of the two
schemes, Alice and Bob can communicate important messages directly under the
control of the third side Charlie. In the first scheme, Alice applies local unitary
operators and local measurement on her particles, and Bob performs local measure-
ments on his portion. Bob can deduce Alice’s secret message by Charlie’s public
communication, and both Alice and Bob’s measurement results. In the second
scheme, Alice and Bob perform local measurements on their respective particles.
Bob can infer Alice’s secret message by his measurement results and both Alice and
Charlie’s encoding classical information. In both schemes Alice can deliver secret
information to Bob in deterministic manner. In the two new quantum secure con-
ditional direct communication schemes, transmitting one bit secret message, Alice
only requires to apply a local unitary transformation or perform a local measure-
ment on one particle and to send one bit classical information to Bob for her to
transmit one bit secret message. The operation on one qubit is simpler than that
on two qubits. So our two proposed schemes are even simpler but more economical
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and more efficient schemes with EPR pairs.
It is worth notice that the classical messages should be authenticated, since a
classical channel is not safe: the message from Charlie to Bob, e.g., could easily be
corrupted by Eve, who may want to disturb the communication between Alice and
Bob. Without authentication Bob cannot be sure whether the signals he receives are
indeed from Charlie. In addition, an actual quantum channel will never be perfect.
Furthermore, without quantum repeaters, the quantum channel will connect at most
a very restricted spatial distance. Such limitations and problems will be discussed
in the future.
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